A group of researchers has published a 131-page security analysis of SHRINCS, a proposed post-quantum signature scheme for Bitcoin, and is inviting the wider community to review it for potential flaws. The analysis, dated November 18, estimates classical security of 121.4 to 122.7 bits for SHRINCS, though these figures rely on three unproven conjectures, according to researcher Mikhail Kudinov.

Key takeaways

  • Researchers have released a 131-page security analysis of SHRINCS, a post-quantum signature scheme proposed for Bitcoin, inviting public scrutiny.
  • SHRINCS combines stateful and stateless designs, with the stateful path offering smaller signatures but requiring careful key management to prevent fund theft.
  • Signature sizes under SHRINCS range from 548 to 4,619 bytes for stateful and 5,777 bytes for stateless, significantly larger than current Bitcoin signatures (64-71 bytes).
  • Larger signature sizes could lead to fewer transactions per block and impact Bitcoin's fee market and overall value proposition, according to Blockstream's Jonas Nick.
  • The analysis is ongoing, with researchers still working on aspects like SM-DSPR properties and improving bounds against quantum attackers.

Understanding SHRINCS: A Hash-Based Approach

SHRINCS is a hash-based signature scheme, meaning its security relies on hash functions rather than the elliptic curve cryptography currently used for Bitcoin signatures. The proposal integrates two designs under a single key: a stateful component built on FXMSS with WOTS+C, and a stateless fallback utilizing SLH-DSA. Researcher Mikhail Kudinov noted that because both designs use the same hash function, the security proof must cover both aspects. This approach aims to provide a path towards quantum resistance for Bitcoin transactions.

The primary trade-off with SHRINCS is signature size. Under the draft proposal, stateful SHRINCS signatures range from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while the stateless fallback is 5,777 bytes. This is considerably larger than current Schnorr signatures on Bitcoin, which are 64 bytes, and ECDSA signatures, typically around 71 bytes. Larger signatures consume more block space, potentially reducing the number of transactions that can fit into each block.

The Challenge of Stateful Signatures

The stateful component of SHRINCS, while more compact, introduces a security risk: it relies on one-time keys. If a wallet inadvertently reuses a key, an attacker could forge a signature for that address and steal funds. This necessitates that wallet software accurately track the state of every key used. The stateless path avoids this specific problem but at the cost of significantly larger signature sizes, as noted in the Bitcoin Magazine report.

Jonas Nick, Blockstream’s director of research, emphasized the importance of robust wallet implementation. He told Isabel Foxen Duke, head of the MARA Foundation, on MARA Foundation TV that wallets must automatically revert to the stateless path if there's any risk of a state counter compromise. Nick stated, “It needs to be impossible for the user to behave in a way that this catastrophic event happens. Wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly.”

Implications for Bitcoin's Network and Users

The increased signature sizes associated with SHRINCS could have significant implications for the Bitcoin network. Nick warned that heavy use of these larger signatures would strain the network. He highlighted concerns about the fee market, stating, “We don’t know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures.” Furthermore, larger signatures mean fewer transactions can be included in each block, which could limit Bitcoin's usability for a broader range of users.

This potential reduction in transaction capacity could alter Bitcoin’s value proposition. For holders, this means a future where transaction fees might be higher or confirmation times longer, depending on network demand and block space availability. The ongoing research aims to balance security against quantum threats with the practicalities of network operation and user experience.

Community Review and Ongoing Research

The researchers behind the SHRINCS analysis are actively seeking community input to identify any potential flaws. Mikhail Kudinov stated that the work has not undergone sufficient peer review, and the project’s GitHub repository cautions that the documents may contain errors and should not be the sole basis for deploying SHRINCS. Kudinov encouraged readers to report any mistakes they find, acknowledging that a proof of this magnitude can contain errors.

The team continues to refine their analysis, particularly regarding a property called SM-DSPR, whose bound is currently conjectured. They are also working on tightening a reprogramming step and improving a bound against quantum attackers. Additionally, the team produced two general results not specific to SHRINCS: a classical bound for ITSR without reprogramming and a quadratic quantum bound for undetectability, which also apply to SPHINCS+ and SLH-DSA.

What This Means for Bitcoin Holders

For Bitcoin holders, the SHRINCS proposal and its security analysis represent a critical step in preparing the network for the potential threat of quantum computing. While quantum computers capable of breaking current cryptographic standards are not yet widely available, research into quantum-resistant solutions is vital for Bitcoin's long-term security. The discussion around SHRINCS highlights the trade-offs involved in adopting new cryptographic schemes, particularly concerning transaction size and network efficiency.

Holders should monitor the progress of post-quantum cryptography research and proposals like SHRINCS. The ongoing community review process for the Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) related to SHRINCS is an opportunity for engineers, cryptographers, and protocol developers to contribute feedback. Understanding these developments can provide insight into how Bitcoin's underlying technology may evolve to maintain its security and functionality in a post-quantum world. For more on this topic, see our guide Quantum Computing and Bitcoin: Everything You Need to Know in 2026.

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